Achterberg, and van der Waal 2013; van Oorschot 2000; Van Oorschot 2006; van der Waal et al. 2010 ). This confluence of left-wing and right-wing views provokes different responses from mainstream parties than when populist parties take a radical position (e.g. anti-immigrant or anti-EU).
Due to the electoral successes of these populist parties, mainstream parties feel pressured to respond. We pose four questions. First, do mainstream parties ignore welfare chauvinism or do they respond to it? Second, if they respond, do they do so immediately or with a time lag? Third, are parties that lose elections or that are in opposition more likely to respond, as some theories suggest (Meguid 2005; Riker 1982; De Vries and Hobolt 2012) ? Third, how do mainstream parties respond: Do they attack populists by defending the welfare state for all or do they accommodate the populist party (Meguid 2005 (Meguid , 2008 ? Organizing our study around these questions, we widen the number of issues analysed in the field of party behaviour (Bale et al. 2010; Van Spanje 2010; De Vries and Hobolt 2012) and thereby contribute to theories of issue entrepreneurship, party adaptation and innovation (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Ezrow 2010; Meguid 2005 Meguid , 2008 Riker 1982; De Vries and Hobolt 2012) . In addition to that, our study has interesting implications for students of populism and the welfare state.
Section 2 explains why populists engage with welfare chauvinism; Section 3 develops hypotheses on how and when mainstream parties respond; Section 4 presents our method; Section 5 tests our hypotheses in a large-N between-country analysis of the party manifestos of European mainstream parties ; and Section 6 zooms in on Denmark and the Netherlands to further substantiate our quantitative findings. We use the Manifesto Projects' Data (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006) as well as an original coding of party manifestos, coalition agreements and other documents.
Populism and welfare chauvinism
Why have populist parties embraced welfare chauvinism? The literature (Abts and Rummens 2007; Barr 2009; Canovan 1999; Decker 2003; Houwen 2011; Kaltwasser 2011; Van Kessel 2011; Mény and Surel 2002; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2011; Pasquino 2008; Plattner 2010; Rooduijn 2013; Taggart 2000; Weyland 2001 ) stresses that the heart of populism concerns the conflict between, on the one hand, the mythical, homogeneous, and unified common people and, on the other hand, an enemy that consists of a divisive political, economic and cultural elite, to which very often a dangerous and threatening 'other' is added. The content of a populist party's programme thus depends on who is identified as the elite or the establishment, to what extent a dangerous 'other' is specified, and which already existing values and ideas are embraced. For example, if the establishment is perceived as neoliberal, capitalist, pro-American, and anti-interventionist, then populism appears as anticapitalist, radical socialist, and anti-American, as in the case of Chavismo in Venezuela in the 2000s (Hawkins 2010) . If the establishment is perceived as authoritarian and statist, then populism appears as radical neoliberal individualism, as Fujimori in the 1990s in Peru, the Danish and Norwegian Progress Parties in the 1970s and Le Pen's FN. Currently, the establishment in many countries in Western Europe is perceived as liberal-left, tolerant, permissive and pro-European, but also as supportive of outsourcing state activities to the market and retrenching the welfare state. Most West European countries have seen successive rounds of cost containment of welfare arrangements, reduction of welfare benefits and tightening of eligibility conditions of social welfare provisions. Welfare retrenchment and restructuring cause widespread anxiety among voters who (expect to) depend on social services and transfers (the sick, the old, the unemployed) and there is therefore a strong demand for political protection of social security (Boeri, Börsch-Supan, and Tabellini 2001; Kumlin and Stadelmann-Steffen 2014 
H2:
Mainstream parties respond (attack or accommodate) to a populist party with a welfare chauvinistic position at the next election.
The effect of a populist party taking a welfare chauvinistic position may be stronger if a party experiences losses. Research on shifts in parties' left-right positions finds that parties change position after they lose elections (Budge 1994; Somer-Topcu 2009) . A lost election indicates that a party is out of touch with public opinion (Budge 1994) . Parties need to change their platform in order to align it with public opinion and improve their electoral performance. However, losing depends on context. Losing elections in multi-party systems does not necessarily mean losing cabinet participation and, reversely, winning elections does not guarantee cabinet participation.
Hence, we propose two hypotheses.
H3:
If a mainstream party has lost the previous elections, it is more likely to respond (attack or accommodate) to a populist party taking a welfare chauvinist position.
H4:
If a mainstream party is in opposition prior to the election, it is more likely to respond (attack or accommodate) to a populist party taking a welfare chauvinist position.
A third aspect that may influence a mainstream party's response is the party's general ideological orientation. Left-wing parties are likely to respond differently to populist parties than right-wing parties. First, left-wing parties -traditionally associated with welfare universalism -may respond to a welfare chauvinistic challenge by prioritizing welfare more. In fact, it may be difficult for left-wing parties to respond by taking a more sceptical position on multiculturalism, because many of these parties are internally divided on this issue. Right-wing parties -traditionally associated with nationalism, monoculturalism and immigration scepticism -may respond to a populist party by stressing scepticism on multiculturalism. For right-wing parties welfare is an internally divisive issue and therefore it is unlikely that right-wing parties prioritize welfare more. Hence, our hypothesis is that if mainstream parties respond, they do so on the issue they are traditionally associated with. If they are losing votes, they may have lost the ownership of a particular issue and a way to get back lost votes is to regain issue ownership on an important issue. Hence, our final hypotheses are the following:
H5:
The left responds to a populist party taking a welfare chauvinistic position by increasing its attention to welfare.
H6:
The right responds to a populist party taking a welfare chauvinistic position by becoming more sceptical of immigration.
Methods
We first conduct a quantitative cross-country analysis of two dependent variables, namely mainstream parties' position on two issues that are at the core of welfare chauvinism: welfare and multiculturalism. For this purpose, we employ the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP). The CMP codes over 1500 party manifestos into 56 different categories. Some categories indicate a party's emphasis on one position of an issue (e.g. emphasis on welfare state expansion). We use these onepositional emphases on welfare and multiculturalism to construct two scales. Specifically, we use five issues: welfare state expansion, welfare state limitation, equality, positive references to multiculturalism and negative references to multiculturalism (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006 ). For welfare we create a position measure by summing the percentages of quasi-sentences dedicated to welfare state expansion and equality in each manifesto and subtracting the number of references to welfare state limitation (Schumacher 2011) . 4 For multiculturalism we created a positional scale subtracting the number of positive references to multiculturalism from the negative references to multiculturalism. Hence, a score of above zero is a position sceptical of multiculturalism. We looked at those parties marked as populists by the majority of the studies on . We calculated their welfare chauvinism score by multiplying the welfare position with negative mentions of multiculturalism. We label this variable welfare chauvinism. We multiply the two positions, because for welfare chauvinism parties need to occupy both a pro-welfare position and a sceptical position on multiculturalism. If we simply added the two issues, parties scoring high on one of the two issues would be wrongly identified as welfare chauvinistic.
We calculate for all mainstream parties their positions on multiculturalism and welfare after 1980.
This results in a total of 94 mainstream parties with 593 party_election year observations. In our cross-country analysis we use the change in position on welfare and on multiculturalism as dependent variables. To test our hypothesis that populists' emphasis on welfare chauvinism spreads to mainstream parties, we use the welfare chauvinism variable described earlier at the current election (H1) and the previous election (H2). To evaluate H3 and H4 we include a dummy variable indicating whether a party is in government (0) or in opposition (1) and a variable indicating the change in seat share at the previous election. We interact these variables with the degree of welfare chauvinism of the populist party. Table 1 lists the descriptive statistics of these variables. 
Cross-country analysis of mainstream party adaptation
Do mainstream parties change position on welfare and multiculturalism if a populist party shifts to a welfare chauvinistic position? Table 2 For welfare we find no significant effect of welfare chauvinism for the left-wing parties (model 3) and a positive effect for the right-wing parties (model 4). This means that right-wing parties become more pro-welfare when populists emphasize welfare chauvinism. The effect size is much larger than in the case of multiculturalism. Right-wing parties shift on average 1.12 points in their welfare position if a populist party had a welfare chauvinism score one standard deviation above the mean.
This contradicts our hypotheses on ideology (H5 and H6). We expected the left and the right to change on issues they own, welfare and scepticism of multiculturalism respectively. Instead, they do the reverse: The left stays the same on welfare, but becomes more sceptical of multiculturalism, and the right becomes more pro-welfare and more sceptical of multiculturalism. The alternative explanation is that the left is still confident on the welfare issue, but appreciates that it is losing votes by being too positive about multiculturalism. The right is unconfident about both its position on welfare and its position on multiculturalism. Table 3 replicates the models in table 2 and adds a lagged welfare chauvinism variable. This way we can evaluate whether mainstream parties respond directly or with a one election lag to welfare chauvinism. Lagged welfare chauvinism is insignificant in all but one case. Right-wing parties apparently become less sceptical of multiculturalism if a populist party emphasized welfare chauvinism at the previous election. The direct effect of welfare chauvinism remains positive and significant in model 6. This means that mainstream right-wing parties become more sceptical of multiculturalism at the same election as the populist party in their party system, but revert to a less sceptical position at the next election. We find no effect of losing elections or opposition/government status in models 1 to 4. However, our hypothesis concerns an interaction effect, and table 4 reports the regression coefficients of the interaction between welfare chauvinism and change in seat share at previous election (models [9] [10] [11] [12] and welfare chauvinism and opposition/government status (models 13-16; for full regressions see table A2 ). The interaction effects are insignificant 6 except one: in model 9 we find a significant negative interaction effect. To facilitate the interpretation of this effect we plot the marginal effect of changes in seat shares for different levels of welfare chauvinism (see figure 2 ). The plot shows that if the populist party in the party system did not emphasize welfare chauvinism (score = 0) there is no effect of changes in seat shares on the multiculturalist position of left-wing parties. However, when a populist party does emphasize welfare chauvinism, the effect of changes in seat shares becomes strongly negative and significant. This means that losing elections (a negative value for the change in the seat share variable) produces a shift towards a more sceptical position on multiculturalism. In other words, mainstream left parties that lost the previous election become more sceptical of multiculturalism if a populist party emphasizes welfare chauvinism. We now turn to the in-depth country analyses to see whether and how welfare chauvinism is accommodated, attacked or ignored.
Denmark: Massive Mainstream Response
We first look at the position changes of Danish mainstream parties (see figure 3 ) between 1994 and 2011. In 1998, the DF -the pioneer in welfare chauvinism -participated for the first time in national elections. In 1998 all parties (Social Democrats, S; Liberals, V; Conservatives, KF) -except the Social Liberals (RV) -became more sceptical on multiculturalism and more pro-welfare. This trend continues over the next elections with each party reverting to a less pro-welfare position and a less sceptical multiculturalism position. Interestingly, the RV moves in the opposite direction, becoming more positive on multicultural issues and thereby developing into DF's natural opponent on this issue. Unlike the other mainstream parties, the RV chose to attack the DF. 
Figure 5. Position on welfare (left) and multiculturalism (right) of mainstream parties
In figure 6 we analyse mention of welfare chauvinism based on our own coding of the manifestos. specific and in fact copied the PVV's proposal that immigrants can only receive social security benefits after 10 years of working in the Netherlands and that language fluency and sufficient integration into society should be a condition for benefits. The subsequent VVD-CDA government, supported by the PVV, included welfare chauvinist proposals in its coalition agreement.
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In the 2012 elections attention to welfare chauvinism declined. The PVV made about half as many references to welfare chauvinism. The core policy proposals remained, but now Europe had become the central issue of the party's electoral campaign. As a consequence there was less attention to welfare chauvinism, although the policy intentions were unchanged. The same conclusion holds for the VVD. The PvdA and CDA also decreased attention, but their attention was already minimal. This illustration of the VVD and welfare chauvinism demonstrates how a combination of poor electoral performance, poor electoral prospects indicated by opinion polls, intra-party pressure and stiff competition on the right force a reluctant party leader to accept welfare chauvinism.
Conclusion
We show, on the basis of comparative data on electoral manifestos, that populist parties -originally neoliberal and anti-welfare -have embraced a pro-welfare position, a strategy that has been Our quantitative results indicate that mainstream responses to welfare chauvinism took place at the same election that the populist party shifted to a (stronger) welfare chauvinistic position. Hence, contrary to our expectations, we did not find a delayed effect (H2), an effect of losing elections (H3 -with the exception of the left and multiculturalism) or an effect of opposition status (H4). Since we did find evidence of a direct response of mainstream parties (H1), we conclude that it is the prospect of losing votes to a populist party that motivates mainstream party responses. This finding contrasts with several studies (Budge, Ezrow, and McDonald 2010; Budge 1994; Somer-Topcu 2009 ) that argue that parties first need to lose an election before they change.
Our case studies of the Netherlands and Denmark revealed two interesting facts that deserve further attention. First, in the Netherlands the pivot party in the 2000s -the CDA -was remarkably unresponsive to welfare chauvinism. It seems that being a pivot party and thus being guaranteed government participation enables a party to remain unresponsive and stick to its own policies.
Second, in Denmark, the RV shifted to a strongly pro-multiculturalism position and thus attacked the welfare chauvinism of the Danish People's Party. Traditionally, the RV is the pivot party in Denmark.
Even though the party is not always in government, its central position in the party system and the minority status of many Danish governments enables the RV to exercise considerable power on government. Hence, we theorize that a central position in a minority cabinet system allows a mainstream party to follow a course close to its core values.
The electoral success of populists with their welfare chauvinistic agenda also changes the political alliances that underlie the welfare state. Afonso (2014) demonstrates that due to the electoral successes of the SVP (Switzerland) and FPÖ (Austria) a majority for welfare state retrenchment emerged. Although it has not been our goal to track policy changes, our reading of the Danish and Dutch cases suggests that populist parties ally with the mainstream right in reducing welfare for immigrants, but ally with the mainstream -or even radical -left in maintaining generous welfare programmes for insiders.
In conclusion, welfare chauvinism is a typical populist response to establishment parties that were involved in downsizing the welfare state. Populist parties embrace a pro-welfare stance in an attempt to pit the people (victims of retrenchment) against the elite (those who attack the established welfare rights of the people), occasionally also blaming others (immigrants) for the welfare state's trouble. This strategy works well for populist parties and is thus an example of an evolving 'winning strategy' of populist parties (Kitschelt and McGann 1995; de Lange 2007) . This success motivates mainstream parties (to varying extents) to accommodate the populist parties. In fact, this confirms Meguid's (2005 Meguid's ( , 2008 Or one could put it in a negative perspective: Mainstream parties compromise their own ideas by following the alleged populist sentiment solely for electoral reasons and hence fail to offer voters an alternative. Because of a lack of public opinion data on welfare chauvinism, we unfortunately cannot uncritically accept one of the two versions. 
